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Why Our Government And Our Constitution?
By

m

CARLE WflITEHEAD

ARTIAL Law in Colorado,"

by my good friend Frazer
Arnold in
the February
RECORD, suggests the above question.
Resident citizens of the United
States and of Colorado have been arrested and confined for weeks without
warrant, charge (formal or informal),
trial or hearing of any nature.
Officers, whose only business in the
vicinity was to maintain order, have
attended meetings and listened to
speeches (without interruption because
there was apparently no legal reason
nor excuse to interrupt) and thereafter, in absence of disorder, or threat
or suspicion thereof, have arrested and
confined the speakers (for what reason
was not stated but very apparently to
prevent further speaking because the
speakers were publicly offered their release on condition that they refrained
from speaking).
Persons who were simply directing
distribution of food and clothing to
men, women and children have been
arrested and confined
(or spirited
away) in like manner without charge
or warrant.
Many other infringements
rights occurred.

of

civil

All this has happened while the
courts have been open and functioning
as usual for the prosecution of law violators.
Brother Arnold

presents a brief in

justification of such a state of affairs.
His argument is based on what I
believe to be an utter misconception
(all too prevalent) of those principles
and objects for which this union, and
governments both national and state,
were created and which constitute the
principal (if not the only) reason for
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the continued existence of these or any
government.
Taking that misconception as a
premise, his conclusions may or may
not be correct. I consider the questions raised and suggested by the
premise of so much more importance
than the arguments and conclusions
based thereon that I shall deal only
with those parts of the article which,
to me, clearly show the error of the
premise and therefore, the immateriality of the arguments and conclusions.
I shall try to confine myself to excerpts which fairly set forth the premise-the point of view-from which
Mr. Arnold starts.
He says: "The primary duty of the
state is self-defense and self-preservation."
One respectable expounder of the
law apparently has a different idea,
"For (says he) the principal aim of
society is to protect individuals in the
enjoyment of those absolute rights
which are vested in them by the immutable laws of nature."
(Cooley's
Blackstone, Book 1, page 124.)
A document which has been charged
with American parentage and with
having something to do with Americanism (of the true, not percentage,
type) states "That to secure these
rights (life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, among others) governments
are instituted among men * * * (and)

whenever any government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right
of the people to alter or abolish it."
(I chance the omission of citation notwithstanding the apparent common unawareness of such a document.)
"This country with its institutions
belongs to the people who inhabit it.
Whenever they shall grow weary of
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the existing government they shall exercise their constitutional right of
amendment or their revolutionary
right to dismember or overthrow it."
(Lincoln's Inaugural Address, March
4, 1861.)
A few years later the Supreme Court
of the United States said that "A country, preserved at the sacrifice of all
the cardinal principles of liberty, is
not worth the cost of preservation."
(Ex-parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 107 at
126.)
I submit that there is very respectable precedent for asserting that the
primary duty of a state is not selfpreservation but is preservation of the
natural rights of the individual.
Mr. Arnold says that "The error into
which enthusiasts for the civil guaranties fall is that they ignore other
articles of the fundamental law of
equal dignity. There are more things
in a constitution than a bill of rights.
All constitutional provisions must be
construed together and harmonized. A
workable government could be established without a bill of rights."
Very true, a workable government
could be established without a written
bill of rights but the constitution of
the United States could not have been
ratified without the assurance of the
adoption o-f the bill of rights and even
with that assurance, it took very
smooth political work and even trickery to accomplish it. Beveridge brings
this out vefy clearly in his "Life of
Marshall."
If the federal constitution was ratified only on the assurance of a bill of
rights, then the bill of rights became,
in substance and in fact (even if not
chronologically) a condition precedent
to the constitution and, therefore, the
provisions of the bill of rights are not
"to be construed together and harmonized" with the provisions of the constitution, but are prior and superior to,
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and are limitations upon, the constitution itself.
Moreover, the primary and fundamental American document is, not the
constitution but the Declaration of Independence, which was made by and
in the name of the United States of
America and declared those inalienable
and natural rights and principles because of the violation of which our
forefathers became revolutionists and
for the preservation and protection of
was originally
which this union
formed. Twelve years later a "more
perfect union"-form of governmenta new instrument-was provided by
the constitution for the purpose of better accomplishing this preservation
and protection. The bill of rights was
adopted in order to reaffirm (and in
part specify) those rights and principles of the Declaration of Independence and to make sure that the newly
provided instrument of preservation
and protection should not be subverted
into an instrument of limitation or
destruction of those rights and principles.
Some may say that these remarks,
pertinent to a government of delegated
and limited powers, are not pertinent
to the government of a state which is
not so limited.
Mr. Arnold shows this to be his point
of view when he says that the Colorado bill of rights in providing "that
no law shall be passed impairing the
freedom of speech * * * imposes a lim-

itation on the legislative and not on
the executive department" and he concludes that the executive may impair
freedom of speech.
In a debate for points this statement
could be disposed of (a) by reading
further, in the same sentence of this
guaranty, that "Every person shall be
free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject," a broad
all-inclusive guaranty, clearly not limited to any one department of govern-
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ment, and (b) by pointing out that
the executive is, what the term implies,
an officer to execute the laws, not to
substitute himself or his judgment
Executive power to do a
therefor.
thing which the legislature itself has
no power to do or to provide for by
law, is unthinkable.
Ex-parte Milligan (supra) involved
a trial by a military commission the
acts of which commission were sought
to be justified. On this point the United States Supreme Court said "They
cannot justify on the mandate of the
president; because he is controlled by
law, and has his appropriate sphere of
duty, which is to execute, not to make,
the laws."
Moreover, when the state follows the
example of the union in attaching a
similar bill of rights to its constitution, the natural conclusion is that it
intends that bill of rights to be a similar reaffirmance of and to provide similar broad and substantial preservation and protection for the inalienable
and natural rights and principles of
the Declaration of Independence.
While this statement of Mr. Arnold
might be disposed of in the above manner, its real importance lies in the
fact that though it expressly relates
only to the subject of freedom of
speech, it, in substance, clearly shows
the error in Mr. Arnold's premisehis misconception of the purpose and
objects, and justification for the continued existence of, any and all government-his assumption that the
state constitution and bill of rights
are the source and origin of the rights
of individuals and that there are no
natural and inalienable rights which
a state government is bound to respect.
The rights and principles enunciated
in the Declaration of Independence
were already established and "self evident" as therein stated. If that document added anything new it was the
statement that governments derive
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"their just powers from the consent of
the governed." Section 1 of the Colorado Bill of Rights expressly adopts
this principle and Section 3 says "That
all persons (not simply citizens) have
certain natural, essential and inalienable rights," etc. An inalienable right
is one which cannot be transferred to
or taken away by anyone-even the
state.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
Eighth Edition, page 876, quotes from
the freedom of speech clauses of the
bills of rights from forty or more of
the states and then, at page 880, says
"It is to be observed of these several
provisions, that they recognize certain
rights as now existing, and seek to
protect and perpetuate them, by declaring that they shall not be abridged or
that they shall remain inviolate. They
do not assume to create new rights,
but their purpose is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of those already
possessed."
While this is said of the freedom of
speech clauses, it very obviously relates to the natural, fundamental, inalienable rights of the individual in
general as well as to the right of freedom of speech.
In his "Suggestions for the Study of
the Law," Cooley's Blackstone, Vol. 1,
page XI, Cooley says: "But in all our
inquiries concerning what the law is,
and how the written constitution affects the rights of individuals, we are
in danger of being led to false conclusions if we do not keep in mind the
primary and fundamental fact that
'written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but the latter
are prior in existence to the former.'
Those instruments have for one of
their chief ends the protection of the
rights of minorities: they seek the establishment of a government of laws
which shall be restrained in its operation within the proper sphere of government, and shall protect the pre-existent rights, not take them away."
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And Blackstone himself says "And
therefore the principal view of human
law is, or ought always to be,- to explain, protect and enforce such rights
as are absolute." (Cooley's Blackstone,
Vol. 1, page 124.)
When any government becomes so
weak and inefficient that it cannot accomplish the primary purpose of its
organization-the protection of the
natural, inalienable individual rights
of its citizens-it has no right to convert itself into an instrument for the
suppression of the exercise of those
rights and for its self-preservation. Its
justification for existence has ceased.
It becomes the "right of the people to
alter or abolish it." "It is their right
-it
is their duty-to throw off such
government and to provide new guards
for their future security" for "A country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the
cardinal principles of liberty, is not
worth the cost of preservation."
I shall not go into a discussion of the
writ of habeas corpus and the suspension thereof. Since Mr. Arnold delivered his address, Judge Symes has
handled that question in a very effective and wholesome manner. I shall
content myself with adding one quotation from "An Old Master."
"Of great importance to the public
is the preservation of this personal
liberty; for ifonce it were left in the
power of any, the highest, magistrate
to imprison arbitrarily Whomever he
or his officers thought proper, (as in
France it is daily practiced by the
crown,) there would soon be an end
of all other rights and immunities.
Some have thought that unjust attacks, even upon life or property, at
the arbitrary will ol the migistrate.
a re less dangerous to the co nniunwealth than such as are made up'on
the personal liberty of the subjcct.,
To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without
accusation or trial, would be so gross
and notorious an act of des-pouism,
--s must at once convey the alarm of
tyranny throughout the whole lRngdom; tut confinement of the person.
ly secretly hurrying him to gaol,
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wherc his sufferings are unknowv,, or
forgotten, is a less public, a less
striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary qovernrmcnt. And yet sometimes, when the
state is in real danger, even this
may be a necessary measure. But
the happiness of our constitution is,
that it is not left to the executive
power to determine when the dang,'r
of the state is so great as to render
this measure expedient; for it is the
parliament only, or legislative power. that, whenever it sees proper,
can authorize the crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a .;hort
and limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any
reason for so doing." (1 Cooley's
Blackstone, p. 135.)
Are we in Colorado in 1928 to have
less protection for our personal liberty
than the Englishman had nearly two
centuries ago?
Due process of law is a subject too
large for full discussion here. One of
Mr. Arnold's conclusions is that "Any
measures they (the military officials)
in good faith adopt are due process of
law."
The spirit and substance of that conclusion appear to me to be very different from the spirit and substance of
the following from the United States
Supreme Court in Fayerweather vs.
Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, at 298, which quotation I submit as food for thought on
this subject: "But a state may not, by
any of its agencies, disregard the prohibitions of the. Fourteenth Amendment. Its judicial authorities may
keep within the letter of the statute
prescribing forms of procedure in the
courts, and give the parties interested
the fullest opportunity to be heard,
and yet it might be that its final action
would be inconsistent with that amendment. In determining what is due
process of law regard must be had to
substance, not to form. This Court
referring to the Fourteenth Amendment has said, 'Can a state make anything due process of law which, by its
own legislation it chooses to declare
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the prohibition to the state is of no
avail, or has no application where the
invasion of private rights is effected
under the forms of state legislation.'
(Davidson vs. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,
102.) The same question could be propounded and the same answer should
be made in reference to judicial proceedings inconsistent with due process
of law."
If this be true of legislative enactment and of judicial proceeding, should
it still be argued that "Any measures
which they (military officials) in good
faith adopt are due process of law"?
Our great men have learned and
have freely acknowledged the fundamental error, the futility, the absolute
danger of repressive measures whether
legislative, judicial or executive.
The late Senator Beveridge in an
address to the American Bar Association at the annual meeting in 1920, entitled "The Assault Upon American
Fundamentals" says:
"The chief argument for the policy
of repression is today what it always
has been, that 'An ounce of prevention
is worth a pound of cure.' Yet on precisely that theory, the British monarchy prohibited .the publishing of
books and writings except those which
were approved and licensed by august
agents of the royal government. It
was this very idea which Milton denounced and refuted in that historic
argument for the Freedom of the
Press, his immortal Areopagitica. It
is this exact doctrine that was practiced by every autocracy from the beginning of time.
"It cannot be too often repeated that
not only has the repressive policy been
ineffective in preventing the spread of
proscribed ideas, but, on the contrary,
it has given those ideas wings of fire;
and that, moreover, by compelling the
advocates of those ideas to work in secret instead of the open, the repressive

policy has made dangerous opinions
which otherwise were harmless. Punishment for preaching religious, economic, social or political beliefs clothes
the preacher with the attractive garments of martyrdom. Moreover the
repressive policy arouses the curiosity
and sympathy of those who, but for
the repression, might have been indifferent or hostile. It is merely human
nature to inquire what the doctrine
is, for advocating which men are punished; and those who are thus led to
investigate proscribed ideas to which
they might otherwise have paid no attention whatever, too often listen or
read with favoring eye or ear. That is
the reason for the well known fact that
radical leaders rejoice in repression."
Repressive measures are born of
fear, usually unfounded. The discussion of repressive measures relates to
the question of freedom of speech more
often than to other natural, individual
rights because that right is probably
more often impaired. The remarks as
to repression of freedom of speech apply, however, with substantially equal
force, to all measures for the repression of the exercise of the natural
rights of the individual. For this reason I trust that my quotations which
mention the right of freedom of speech
will not be misunderstood as being
limited simply to that right. o
Benjamin Franklin said "Freedom
of speech is the principal pillar of free
government; when this support is
taken away the constitution of free society is dissolved and tyranny is erected on its ruins. Those abuses of freedom of speech are the excesses of liberty. They ought to be repressed-but
to whom dare we commit the care of
doing it? An evil magistrate entrusted
with power to punish for errors, would
be armed with a weapon the most destructive and terrible. Under the pretense of pruning off the exuberant
branches, he would be apt to destroy
the tree."
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In quoting the following from an article by Dr. Frank Crane entitled
"Trembling Patriots", I do not quote
from him as an authority but for the
reason that he has in this case put
some fundamental truths in very clear
language. He says: "It needs to be
clearly understood that those trembling patriots who are so timid that
they would imprison, suppress or punish anybody who thinks that the government should be changed, are the
real manufacturers of bolshevism and
lawlessness in this country. If there
is anything worse than a lie, it is a
silly attempt to suppress it." And
again, "I do not like, any more than
the nervous policeman likes, the scarecrow-shrieking of the soured apostles
of discontent, but I like less the czaristic method of dealing with them.
Meet ideas with ideas, lies with truth,
unreason with reason and let us have
done forever with the fallacy of force."
I have made no attempt at a technical legal argument nor to answer all
of the points raised by Mr. Arnold. To
do so would, in my mind, belittle the
subject which is really involved and
to which we should all give our attention.
I believe that true Americanism is
big enough and on a sufficiently solid
foundation, to withstand all assaults
of its enemies and that its only danger
lies in the unfounded and unreasoning
fear of some of its avowed friends.
I believe that martial law in Colorado and the things that have been
done under it and in its name are the
result of such an unfounded and unreasoning fear resulting in turn from
a failure to fully appreciate the
strength and power of true Americanism.
We have boasted that this is the
land of liberty. I would like to keep
it so and I know of no more appropriate way to close this article than with
the Ode of John Hay to Liberty:
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LIBERTY
What man is there so bold that he
should say
"Thus, and thus only, would I have
the sea?"
For whether lying calm and beautiful
Clasping the earth in love, and throwing back
The smile of heaven from waves of
amethyst;
Or whether, freshened by the busy
winds,
It bears the trade and navies of the
wor]d
To ends of use or stern activity;
Or whether, lashed by tempests, it
gives way
To elemental fury, howls and roars
At all its rocky barriers, in wild lust
Of ruin drinks the blood of living
things,
And strews its wrecks o'er leagues of
desolate shore,Always it is the sea, and men bow
down
Before its vast and varied majesty.
So all in vain will timorous ones essay
To set the metes and bounds of Liberty.
For Freedom is its own eternal law;
It makes its own conditions, and in
storm
Or calm alike fulfills the unerring Will.
Let us not then despise it when it lies
Still as a sleeping lion, while a swarm
Of gnat-like evils hovers round its
head,
Nor doubt it when in mad, disjointed
times
It shakes the torch of terror, and its
cry
Shrills o'er the quaking earth, and in
the flame
Of riot and war we see its awful form
Rise by the scaffold, where the crimson
axe
Rings down its grooves the knell of
shuddering kings.
Forever in thine eyes, 0 Liberty,
Shines that high light whereby the
world is saved,
And though thou slay us, we will trust
in thee!

An Agnostic
"An agnostic is a person who knows
he knows nothing; and believes no
other person knows any more than he
does."-R. G. Ingersoll.

